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Abstract 
Science is a process of inquiry: a process of asking and answering 
questions.  However, a good question is more than an interrogatory, and 
a good answer is more than information: there are logical constraints that 
dictate when a question is answerable and what qualifies as an answer.  
This paper will provide an understanding of (1) when a question is 
answerable, (2) when a question is not ready to be asked, (3) when a 
question is trivial, (4) what is required for a response to be an answer, 
and (5) what sequence of inquiry is required to identify an answer.  
Equipped with this understanding, a scientist can better determine an 
appropriate sequence of study for a research program as well as identify 
the necessary arguments to warrant claims of understanding, funding, 
and the publication of research findings. 
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1 Introduction  
A scientist answers questions.  To do this well requires an understanding of 
what is a good question and a good answer, which in turn requires 
understanding the logic of inquiry.  This paper will explain key properties of 
questions and answers that constrain research and guide research programs 
thereby clarifying requirements for questions, answers, necessary preliminary 
work, and possible future research.  Note, this article regards applied 
philosophical issues, it does not address the psychology or empirical 
requirements of scientific inquiry. 
There are various approaches to the logic of questions and answers in the 
linguistics and philosophy literatures (formally called erotetics).  For 
information on some approaches see the references by Scha and Wiśniewski 
(Scha, 1983, Wiśniewski, 1995).  However, Rescher’s book Inquiry Dynamics 
(Rescher, 2000), which underlies this presentation, may be more directly 
applicable. 
 
 
2 The basics of questions and answers 
Questions are requests for specific information.  If I ask `Can stress cause 
depression? and receive the response `Stress can cause high blood pressure, 
this response may be informative but it does not satisfy the question.  If a 
response does not satisfy the question, then it is not a possible answer to that 
question.  A response satisfies a question, right or wrong, if given it were 
understood it would not be reasonable to repeat the question.  Consider the 
question `Is it raining outside? being followed by the response `Yes, it is 
raining outside, it would not be reasonable to repeat the question: we would 
not say `But is it raining outside?.  The response satisfied the question.  
Alternatively, consider if the question `Is it raining outside? was responded to 
by `Green is my favourite color, it would be reasonable to say `But is it 
raining outside?.  If the response to `Can stress cause depression? is `Stress 
can cause high blood pressure, it would be reasonable to reply with `But can 
stress cause depression?.  Assuming the response is understood, the need to 
repeat the question is an indicator that the response was not a possible answer.  
A possible answer need not be correct to satisfy a question in this sense. 
Although an answer resolves the question-specific inquiry, not all 
questions are answerable: those that presuppose propositions taken to be false 
are not answerable.  Consider the question `Has Fred stopped petting his dog?.  
This question presupposes, among other things, that Fred has or had a dog. If 
this is taken to be false (i.e. Fred is believed to never have had a dog), then the 
question is not answerable.  Neither yes nor no suffices.  It would not make 
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sense to say `Fred does not have nor has ever had a dog, but has Fred stopped 
petting his dog?.  To be answerable there must be at least one response that 
satisfies the question.  Here is another example: `How does stress cause 
depression?.  This question presupposes that stress causes depression; if the 
proposition stress causes depression is taken to be false, then the question of 
how it does so is not answerable.  It would be nonsensical to say `Stress does 
not cause depression, but tell me how stress causes depression?  A question 
that is not answerable is an illegitimate question.     
If, on the other hand, the truth of a question’s presuppositions is unknown 
(I do not know whether Fred has or ever has had a dog or whether stress 
causes depression), then the legitimacy of the question is unknown.  In this 
case the question is premature.  Premature questions lead to new questions 
regarding the unknown presuppositions that must be answered before 
legitimacy can be determined.  If the truth of the proposition stress causes 
depression is unknown, then the question `How does stress cause depression?, 
which presupposes this proposition, is premature.  Legitimacy depends first on 
answering the question `Does stress cause depression?  If the answer is `Yes, 
stress causes depression, then the question regarding how stress causes 
depression is legitimate.  If the answer is `No, stress does not cause 
depression, then the how question is illegitimate. 
A question that is not an inquiry is trivial.  A trivial question is one for 
which the answer is taken to be known.  Consequently, a question is trivial 
once it is determined there is only one possible answer since this possible 
answer must be the answer; no inquiry is required.  Also, a question is trivial 
once the actual answer from a complete set of possible answers is taken to be 
determined; again, no further inquiry is required.  To claim a question is 
trivial, however, is not to claim its answer is unimportant, it is only to say that 
since we presume to know the answer, the question itself does not require 
inquiry.    
It should be clear that inquiry leads to a sequence of questions that can be 
tracked backward or forward.  A premature question requires answers to 
questions regarding its presuppositions.  This type of reasoning allows the 
scientist to identify work that must be completed before the target question is 
legitimate.  Since the answer to a question can be the presupposition for other 
questions, inquiry is a forward-oriented process as well.  If the question `How 
does stress cause depression? is legitimate and we take its answer to be `Stress 
causes depression via mechanism M1., then based on this answer we might 
ask `How does M1 cause depression?’ or `Why does stress cause depression 
by M1 rather than mechanism M2? (which also presupposes M2 does not 
explain).  And so, our research program regarding stress and depression 
continues. 
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Responses also have presuppositions.  For example, the question `Does 
stress cause depression? has a response of `Yes, stress causes depression, but 
this response cannot be true unless both stress and depression exist.  If one of 
these presuppositions is taken to be false, then the response is considered false 
and thereby cannot be an answer to the question.  The response `No, stress 
does not cause depression, however, does not presuppose stress and 
depression exist; indeed, this response may be offered for the very reason that 
stress or depression are taken not to exist.  Consequently, if the 
presuppositions of each response are taken to be true, the set of possible 
answers to the question `Does stress cause depression? is {`Yes, stress causes 
depression; `No, stress does not cause depression}.  However, if the 
presupposition that depression exists is taken to be false, then the set of 
possible answers is {`No, stress does not cause depression}, which comprises 
only one response and is thereby trivial—we have what we take to be the 
answer.  
Propositions can also presuppose the truth of other propositions.  For 
example, the proposition stress causes depression is true only if the 
propositions stress exists and depression exists are true; consequently the first 
proposition presupposes the other two.  Presuppositions are also transitive:  if 
one statement or proposition, say s, presupposes another proposition p, and the 
proposition p presupposes the proposition q, then s also presupposes q.  For 
example, the question `How does stress cause depression? presupposes stress 
causes depression, and stress causes depression presupposes stress exists and 
depression exists; therefore, the initial question not only presupposes stress 
causes depression but also stress exists and depression exists.  This transitivity 
generates a hierarchy of presuppositions.  In the preceding example, the initial 
question is premature until the proposition stress causes depression is 
confirmed.  This requires answering the implied question `Does stress cause 
depression?, but this question is itself premature until its presuppositions are 
established.  So, before these questions are legitimate, the questions `Does 
stress exist? and `Does depression exist? must be affirmatively answered.  A 
legitimate line of inquiry must respect the presupposition hierarchy. 
For notational purposes, I will indicate a set of responses by {R … }, and 
set of possible answers by {A … }, and the list of presuppositions by <…> 
(however, I will not include all presuppositions, only those being discussed).  
A question Q that has a response set with k responses {R r1, r2,..rk} may be 
written as Q{R r1, r2,..rk}.  A question Q that presupposes a proposition p is 
indicated as Q<p>.  A response r that presupposes proposition p is indicated as 
r<p>.  And, a proposition p that presupposes q is written as p<q>.  We can 
nest the presupposition delimiter to represent a presupposition hierarchy.  For 
example, we can denote the case in which Q has response r that presupposes p, 
and p presupposes q, as Q{R  r<p<q>>}; moreover, for greater clarity we can 
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provide subscripts to the presupposition delimiters to facilitate tracking the 
nested lists: for example, Q{R r<1 pa <2 qa, qb 2>, pb 1>} indicates 
presupposition list 1 includes pa and pb, and presupposition list 2 (which are 
presuppositions of pa) includes qa and qb.  Although r<p<q>> implies r<p, q>, 
I will use the former notation to represent the latter.  In other words, I will 
leave the implication of the transitive property of presuppositions implicit: 
writing that r presupposes p, which presupposes q, as r<p<q>> will be taken to 
imply that r also presupposes q.  If I wish to denote a question, its answer set, 
and the question’s presuppositions but not response-specific presuppositions, it 
would be indicated as Q{A r1, r2,..rk}<p<q>>.  I indicate all presuppositions at 
the answer level as Q{A r1<p, p1>,r2<p, p2>,..rk <p, pk>}, noting that p, being 
common across all answers is therefore a presupposition for the question itself, 
whereas the pi denote response-specific presuppositions.  The question-
specific presuppositions can be “factored” out of the last notation so that Q{A 
r1<p1>, r2<p2>,..rk<pk>}<p> means the same as Q{A r1<p, p1>, r2<p, 
p2>,..rk<p, pk>}. 
A presupposition of a question, as opposed to a presupposition of a 
response, is a proposition that all possible answers presuppose.  Consider the 
example `How does stress cause depression? {R `Stress causes depression via 
a cortisol mechanism<stress causes depression, cortisol exists>; `Stress causes 
depression via an anxiety mechanism<stress causes depression, anxiety 
exists>}.  Each response presupposes the existence of a different mechanism 
(cortisol or anxiety), and both responses presuppose stress causes depression.   
There is no way to answer the question without presupposing the common 
proposition that stress causes depression; therefore, if this proposition is false, 
the question cannot be answered and is thereby illegitimate.  The question and 
its presupposition are `How does stress cause depression?<stress causes 
depression>, which also presupposes that stress exists and depression exists.  If 
a scientist submits an application for funding proposing to answer the question 
`How does stress cause depression? but has not established that stress causes 
depression, then reviewers may deem the question to be premature and request 
the proposition stress causes depression be established first.  
What happens if a response-specific presupposition is taken to be false?  
That response cannot be a possible answer and should be excluded from the set 
of possible answers:  stress cannot possibly cause depression via anxiety if 
anxiety does not exist.  Consider the following example and whether the 
response set is also the set of possible answers. 
`Is it raining outside? {R `Yes, it is raining outside; `No, it is 
not raining outside} 
To determine the set of possible answers we need to consider each 
response and its presuppositions.  The response `Yes, it is raining outside 
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presupposes rain exists, outside exists, and rain is the type of thing that can 
occur outside. `No, it is not raining outside has no such presuppositions. So, 
indicating the presupposed propositions related to each response gives 
`Is it raining outside?{R `Yes, it is raining outside <rain exists, 
outside exists, rain can occur outside>; `No, it is not raining 
outside <>} 
If all presuppositions are taken to be true, then each response is a 
possible answer and the set of possible answers is the same as the indicated 
response set: 
`Is it raining outside?{A `Yes, it is raining outside; `No, it is 
not raining outside}. 
Does the set of possible answers to all `Is X the case?-type questions 
always contain both Yes and No?  Consider the following example. 
`Is there a Unicorn in the kitchen?{R `Yes, there is a unicorn in 
the kitchen; `No, there is not a unicorn in the kitchen} 
The response `Yes, there is a unicorn in the kitchen presupposes 
unicorns and kitchens exist as well as unicorns are the type of thing that can be 
in kitchens. `No, there is not a unicorn in the kitchen has no such 
presuppositions. So, including the presupposed propositions gives: 
`Is there a Unicorn in the kitchen?{R `Yes, there is a unicorn in 
the kitchen <unicorns exist, kitchens exist, unicorns can be in 
kitchens>; `No, there is not a unicorn in the kitchen <>} 
If the presupposition that unicorns exist is not taken to be true, then the 
`Yes… response is not a possible answer and the set of possible answers does 
not include this response: 
`Is there a Unicorn in the kitchen?{A `No, there is not a unicorn 
in the kitchen} 
This is a case in which the set of possible answers contains only one 
response.  A question with a singleton as a set of possible answers is trivial, 
which is to say when we have only one possible answer, we have the answer; 
no further inquiry is required (i.e. there is no need to look for unicorns in the 
kitchen).  Ultimately, the goal of scientific inquiry is typically to identify the 
actual answers, but if we start with only one possible answer, then there is no 
need for inquiry.   
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3 The logic of inquiry applies to beliefs 
I have been stating whether propositions have been taken to be true or 
taken to be false rather than stating whether they are in fact true or in fact 
false.  This is because the logic of inquiry is dependent on a given set of 
beliefs.  Consequently, a question may be legitimate, premature, or trivial 
according to one set of beliefs and not so according to another; and, a response 
may be a possible answer in one set of beliefs and not a possible answer in 
another.  Therefore legitimacy, prematurity, triviality, and the status of 
responses can differ across people.  If Lisa believes depression exists, Fred 
believes that depression does not exist, and I am unsure then (assuming all 
other presuppositions are believed by all) the question regarding how stress 
causes depression is legitimate for Lisa, illegitimate for Fred, and premature 
for me.  If Lisa were to pose the question to Fred and me, Fred may well say 
`Your question presupposes something that does not exist and is therefore not 
answerable, and I may reply `I cannot answer your question because I do not 
know whether it is answerable.  Of course, Lisa may seek answers for herself 
since to her the question is legitimate.  If all three of us were reviewing an 
application for funding to address the question, then Lisa may be willing to 
consider the substantive and methodological merits of the proposal (it is after 
all a legitimate question), Fred would reject the proposal out of hand (no point 
in considering the merit of research to answer an unanswerable question), and 
I would recommend that the question of depression’s existence must be 
answered first (no point in considering the merit of research to answer a 
question that may not be answerable). 
 
 
4 From possible answers to actual answers 
Having a legitimate question and corresponding set of possible answers is 
necessary but not sufficient for successful inquiry.  Successful inquiry requires 
culling what we take to be the answer from the set of possible answers.  
Understanding this step requires understanding why in the preceding sections 
answers are demarked with single quotes but propositions are indicated using 
italics and no quotes.  What is being differentiated here is a statement from its 
content, an assertion from the content of that assertion.  For example, `There is 
a unicorn in the kitchen is a statement that asserts the proposition there is a 
unicorn in the kitchen; `The kitchen has a unicorn in it is another statement 
that asserts the same proposition that there is a unicorn in the kitchen.  It is in 
virtue of this distinction between an assertion and its content that we can 
reduce a set of possible answers to the set of actual answers by addressing the 
hierarchy of presuppositions. 
Understanding Scientific Inquiry 
 
10 
 
An assertion always presupposes its content.  Not only does the assertion 
`Stress causes depression presuppose stress exists and depression exists, but 
also that stress causes depression.    In fact, the assertion is first and foremost 
presupposing its content, and then the presupposed content itself presupposes 
more elementary propositions.  So, a more accurate representation of the 
structure for this example is `Stress causes depression <stress causes 
depression <stress exists, depression exists>>.   If we apply this hierarchical 
structure to a question we get, for example: 
`Does stress cause depression? {R`Yes, stress causes 
depression<stress causes depression <stress exists, depression 
exists>>; `No, stress does not cause depression<stress does not 
cause depression>} 
This hierarchy dictates the necessary sequence of inquiry.  The 
response `Yes, stress causes depression presupposes its content stress causes 
depression, which in turn presupposes that stress and depression exist; 
consequently, we need to first address the deepest presuppositions that stress 
exists and depression exists before we can address the higher-level 
presupposition of the content proposition stress causes depression.  Ultimately 
if we confirm or disconfirm the content proposition, we will in this case have 
only one answer remaining in the response set.  Notice that if `Yes… is the 
answer, then `No… cannot be the answer: one answer logically precludes all 
others, which is not generally true of all sets of possible answers.   
Consider the sequence of inquiry required for the question `How does 
stress cause depression?, delineated below by indentation for clarity. 
`How does stress cause depression? 
{R`Stress causes depression via cortisol 
<1 stress causes depression via cortisol  
<2 stress causes depression  
<3 stress exists, depression exists 3>, 
     cortisol exists 2>1>;   
`Stress causes depression via anxiety 
<4 stress causes depression via anxiety  
<5 stress causes depression  
<6 stress exists, depression exists 6>,  
     anxiety exists 5> 4>} 
The first response to the question regards cortisol.  This response 
presupposes its content stress causes depression via cortisol.  Note that the 
first list of presuppositions for any response always contains only one 
proposition, the content proposition.  In this example, we can address this 
proposition by answering its related question `Does stress cause depression via 
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cortisol?, but this is a premature question if its presuppositions are not already 
established.  The content proposition of the response presupposes stress causes 
depression and cortisol exists (presupposition list 2).  We can address these 
presuppositions by asking their related questions `Does stress cause 
depression? and `Does cortisol exist?.  However, the first of these questions, 
`Does stress cause depression?, presupposes stress exists and depression exists 
(presupposition list 3) and is premature if these propositions are not taken to be 
true.  Therefore, we need to start by establishing whether stress and depression 
exist, as well as whether cortisol exists before the higher order presuppositions 
that depend on them can be addressed and ultimately the content proposition, 
presupposition list 1, can be used to determine whether the response can be 
taken as an answer to the question. The same logic applies to the second 
response.  Once a complete set of answers is culled from the set of all possible 
answers, the question becomes trivial. 
From this perspective, the set of possible answers are the responses that 
can resolve the question-specific inquiry and for which all presuppositions of 
the content propositions are presumed true, leaving the content propositions 
themselves undetermined.  The final answers from this set of possible answers 
are determined by investigating which of the content propositions are taken to 
be true.  This set of answers need not be a singleton: there may be more than 
one answer, in which case their conjunction can be considered a single answer.   
Do we need the full set of possible answers to engage inquiry into a 
legitimate question?  No.  We can focus on whether a given response provides 
an answer without knowing all possible responses.  For example, `How does 
stress cause depression? may have a very large, even unknown, set of possible 
answers, but we can focus on the response `Stress causes depression via 
cortisol without knowing the other possible answers by asking `Does stress 
cause depression via cortisol?.  If the answer is yes to this question, then we 
have an answer to the how question.  However, this answer is incomplete.  
Knowing that cortisol answers the how question does not mean that there are 
no other answers as well (perhaps anxiety also causes depression).  If instead 
we take the answer to be that cortisol does not answer the how question, this 
does not tell us what does.  So, we can inquire into a question without knowing 
the complete set of possible answers, but we may not be able to provide a 
complete answer to the question by doing so. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Understanding Scientific Inquiry 
 
12 
 
5 Inquiry as a process of belief change 
Inquiry is a process by which beliefs are changed.  Any given set of beliefs 
comprise propositions that can be presupposed in questions.  For example, the 
proposition stress causes depression, if taken to be true, can be a 
presupposition for asking `How does stress cause depression?.  Also, each 
proposition itself can be reconsidered.  For example, the proposition stress 
causes depression can be reconsidered by the question `Does stress cause 
depression?.  Reconsideration is a process of opening up a previously closed 
question: going from a set of answers to an expanded set of possible answers: 
for example, going from `Does stress cause depression?{A`Yes, stress causes 
depression}, which is trivial, to `Does stress cause depression?{A`Yes, stress 
causes depression; `No, stress does not cause depression}, which is not 
trivial.   
Consequently, we can think of a set of all legitimate questions allowed by 
a given belief set as including all questions that the belief set can support as 
presuppositions having answers that produce new beliefs and questions that 
reconsider existing beliefs.  Together these questions allow for changes in a 
belief set. The answer to a new legitimate question increases the set of 
believed propositions (and thereby expands the set of possible legitimate 
questions), whereas reconsideration can change the existing belief set by 
substituting the proposition of a new answer for the old answer.  This should 
be clear from the discussion above: if `Does stress cause depression? is 
legitimate and not a reconsideration, then its answer will constitute a new 
proposition taken to be true—the belief set is thereby expanded.  If on the 
other hand the proposition that stress causes depression is a current belief, the 
question `Does stress cause depression? is a reconsideration, which if it is 
subsequently answered `No, stress does not cause depression will constitute a 
change in belief by replacing stress causes depression with stress does not 
cause depression.   
A change in belief due to a reconsidered proposition has ripple effects.  For 
example, all propositions in the belief set that presupposed a reconsidered 
proposition now taken to be false are no longer valid.  Any proposition that is 
recognized as no longer valid is no longer logically in the belief set.   For 
example, suppose we reconsider the belief in the proposition that stress exists:  
`Does stress exist?{A `Yes, stress exists<stress exists>, `No, stress does not 
exist<stress does not exist>}.  Suppose further that the result of our 
reconsideration is `No, stress does not exist, then not only does the belief set 
replace stress exists with stress does not exist, but all beliefs that presuppose 
stress exists are no longer valid.   
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6 Conclusion 
The logic of inquiry presented above provides an understanding of 
questions and answers to guide scientists in identifying when a question is 
premature, when a question is legitimate, when a question is trivial, and how 
to identify when a response is a possible answer and when it is indeed the 
answer.  There are five main points to remember: 
1. A question that presupposes a proposition taken to be false is not 
answerable and is thereby illegitimate. For example, the question `How 
does Regulatory Focus Theory explain variation in risk tolerance? is 
illegitimate if it is believed that risk tolerance does not vary.  Such a 
question, with a presupposition taken to be false, should not be posed. 
2. A question that presupposes a proposition the truth of which is 
unknown is premature.  Belief regarding the truth or falsity of the 
presupposition must be determined before the question can be 
identified as legitimate or illegitimate. For example, the question `How 
does Regulatory Focus Theory explain variation in risk tolerance? is 
premature if variation in risk tolerance is not established.  Such a 
question requires additional work to establish the requisite 
presupposition before it can legitimately be posed. 
3. A response is a possible answer if it can satisfy the question and if all 
the propositions presupposed by the content of the response are taken 
to be true.  If a presupposition of a response’s content proposition is 
taken to be false, the response is not a possible answer.    
4. Actual answers are the subset of possible answers for which their 
presupposed content is taken to be true. 
5. A question is trivial if its set of possible answers contains only one 
response or only responses with content propositions all taken to be 
true.  For example, the question `Does Regulatory Focus Theory 
explain age disparities in communication strategies? is trivial if the 
phenomenon of age disparities in communication strategies does not 
exist. The `Yes… response presupposes the phenomenon; therefore, if 
the phenomenon is taken not to exist, it is not a possible answer.  In 
this case the `No… answer is the only possible answer and is therefore 
the answer, taken to be known a priori.  Consequently, the question is 
trivial.  As another example, consider `How does stress cause 
depression?’{A`Stress causes depression via cortisol’; `Stress causes 
depression via anxiety’}.  If we take this to be the complete set of 
actual answers (i.e. we take it that all answers in the set are in fact 
answers and that there are no other actual answers not included in the 
set), then the question is trivial.  Explanation-seeking questions (why 
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and how questions) are often never formally trivial because a complete 
answer is often not achieved.   
Understanding the logic of inquiry will help in formulating research 
programs by identifying the presupposition hierarchy underlying their ultimate 
goals.  This understanding will also assist in writing applications for research 
funding and writing scientific papers.  The background for such an application 
or paper should provide compelling arguments for all contestable 
presuppositions lest the question be deemed illegitimate or premature by the 
reader.  Similarly, presuppositions of any proposed answer need to be 
established before it can be considered a possible answer. 
Although the preceding has been framed in terms of the overall research 
question, the same logic applies to any question or assertion (to assert a 
proposition is to affirmatively answer the question regarding the proposition’s 
truth).  For example, to claim that a particular data set provides evidence for a 
hypothesis presupposes that the measurement and methods underlying the 
evidential claim are valid and reliable thereby requiring affirmative answers to 
methodological questions prior to making the evidential claim.  These answers 
can be essential background for successful funding applications and research 
papers. 
The process of scientific inquiry requires nuanced considerations of 
credibility and belief.  In its actual application, we would say that the degree to 
which a question is legitimate depends on the degree to which its 
presuppositions are taken to be true or taken to be false.  Similarly, for any 
proposition, its credibility is dependent upon the credibility of its 
presuppositions.  The better evidence and argument that can be amassed in 
support of a proposition, the more credible is that proposition and the more 
confident we can be in using it as a presupposition for questions, assertions, 
and other propositions.   
In general, a careful consideration of the presupposition hierarchy for 
inquiry provides guidance regarding both the sequence of study underlying a 
research program as well as highlighting the background required for 
compelling funding applications and manuscript submissions. 
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